We introduce the notion of asymmetric programmable hash functions (APHFs, for short), which adapts Programmable hash functions, introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz (Crypto 2008, Springer, 2008, with two main differences. First, an APHF works over bilinear groups, and it is asymmetric in the sense that, while only secretly computable, it admits an isomorphic copy which is publicly computable. Second, in addition to the usual programmability, APHFs may have an alternative property that we call programmable pseudorandomness. In a nutshell, this property states that it is possible to embed a pseudorandom value as part of the function's output, akin to a random oracle. In spite of the apparent limitation of being only secretly computable, APHFs turn out to be surprisingly powerful objects. We show that they can be used to generically implement both regular and linearly-homomorphic signature schemes in a simple and elegant way. More importantly, when instantiating these generic construc-tions with our concrete realizations of APHFs, we obtain: (1) the first linearly-homomorphic signature (in the standard model) whose public key is sub-linear in both the dataset size and the dimension of the signed vectors; (2) short signatures (in the standard model) whose public key is shorter than those by Hofheinz-Jager-Kiltz (Asiacrypt 2011, Springer, 2011 and essentially the same as those by Yamada et al. (CT-RSA 2012, Springer, 2012.
Introduction
Programmable hash functions Programmable hash functions (PHFs) were introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz [30] as an information theoretic tool to "mimic" the behavior of a random oracle in finite groups. In a nutshell, a PHF H is an efficiently computable function that maps suitable inputs (e.g., binary strings) into a group G, and can be generated in two different, indistinguishable, ways. In the standard modality, H hashes inputs X into group elements H(X) e G. When generated in trapdoor mode, a trapdoor allows one to express every output in terms of two (user-specified) elements g, h e G, i.e., one can compute two integers ax , bx such that H (X) = gax hbx . Finally, H is programmable in the sense that it is possible to program the behavior of H so that its outputs contain (or not) g with a certain probability. More precisely, H is said (m, n)-programmable if for all disjoint sets of inputs {X1, ..., Xm } and {Z1, ..., Znj, the joint probability that Vi, axt = 0 and V j, a zj = 0 is significant (e.g., 1 /poly(Z)). Programmability turns out to be particularly useful in several security proofs. For instance, consider a security proof where a signature on H(X) can be simulated as long as ax = 0 (i.e., g does not appear) while a forgery on H(Z) can be successfully used if aZ = 0 (i.e., g does appear). Then one could rely on an (m, 1)-programmability of H to "hope" that all the queried messages X1, ..., Xm are simulatable, i.e., Vi, axt = 0, while the forgery message Z is not, i.e., aZ = 0. PHFs essentially provide a nice abstraction of the so-called partitioning technique used in many cryptographic proofs.
O u r contrib u tio n
Asymmetric programmable hash functions We introduce the notion of asymmetric pro grammable hash functions (APHFs) which modifies the original notion of PHFs [30] in two main ways. First, an APHF H maps inputs into a bilinear group G and is only secretly computable. At the same time, an isomorphic copy of H can be publicly computed in the target group Gt , i.e., anyone can compute e(H(X), g). 1 Second, when generated in trapdoor mode, for two given group elements g, h e G such that h = gz, the trapdoor allows one to write every H(X) as gcx (z) for a degree-d polynomial cx (z).
We define two main programmability properties of APHFs. The first one is an adaptation of the original programmability notion, and it says that H is (m, n, d )-programmable if it is (m, n)-programmable as before except that, instead of looking at the probability that ax = 0, one now looks at whether cX,0 = 0, where cX,0 is the coefficient of the degree-0 term of the polynomial cx (•) obtained using the trapdoor.2 The second programmability property is new and is called programmable pseudorandomness. Roughly speaking, programmable pseudorandomness says that one can program H so that the values gcX,0 look random to any polynomially-bounded adversary who observes the public hash key and the outputs of H on a set of adaptively chosen inputs. This functionality turns out to be useful in security proofs where one needs to cancel some random values for simulation purposes (we explain this in slightly more detail later in the introduction). In other words, programmable pseudorandom-ness provides another random-oracle-like property for standard model hash functions, that is to "hide" a PRF inside the hash function. This is crucial in our security proofs, and we believe it can have further applications.
Applications In principle, secretly computable PHFs seem less versatile than regular PHFs. In this work, however, we show that, for applications such as digital signatures, APHFs turn out to be more powerful than their publicly computable counterparts. Specifically, we show how to use APHFs to realize both regular and linearly-homomorphic signatures secure in the standard model. Next, we show efficient realizations of APHFs that, when plugged in our generic constructions, yield new and existing schemes that improve the state-of-the-art in the following way. First, we obtain the first linearly homomorphic signature scheme, secure in the standard model, achieving a public key which is sub-linear in both the dataset size and the dimension of the signed vectors. Second, we obtain regular signature schemes, matching the efficiency of the ones in [39] , thus providing the shortest signatures in the standard model with a public key shorter than in [32] .
In the following we elaborate more on these solutions. Linearly-homomorphic signatures with short public key in the standard model Imag ine a user Alice stores one or more datasets D1, D2,..., Dt on a cloud server. Imagine also that some other user, Bob, is allowed to perform queries over Alice's datasets, i.e., to compute one or more functions Fi,..., Fm over any Di. The crucial requirement here is that Bob wants to be ensured about the correctness of the computation's results Fj (Di), even if the server is not trusted. An obvious way to do this (reliably) is to ask Alice to sign all her data Di = mi \ . .., m ( N). Later, Bob can check the validity of the computation by (1) download ing the full dataset locally, (2) checking all the signatures and (3) redoing the computation from scratch. Efficiency-wise, this solution is clearly undesirable in terms of bandwidth, storage (Bob has to download and store potentially large amount of data) and computation (Bob has to recompute everything on his own).
A much better solution comes from the notion of homomorphic signatures [11] . These allow to overcome the first issue (bandwidth) in a very elegant way. Using such a scheme, Alice can sign m i,..., m^, thus producing signatures oi, . . . , on , which can be verified exactly as ordinary signatures. In addition, the homomorphic property provides the extra feature that, given oi, . . . , on and some function F : M N ^ M, one can compute a signature a p,y on the value y = F (m 1 , . . . ,mn ) without knowledge of the secret signing key sk. In other words, for a set of signed messages and any function F , it is possible to provide y = F (m 1 ,...,m n ) along with a signature ap,y vouching for the correctness of y . The security notion of homomorphic signatures guarantees that creating a signature ap,y* for a y * = F (m1 , ...,m^) is computationally hard, unless one knows sk.
To solve the second issue and allow Bob to verify efficiently such signatures (i.e., by spend ing less time than that required to compute F ), one can use homomorphic signatures with effi cient verification, a notion recently introduced in [20] . The notion of homomorphic signature was first introduced by Johnson et al. [33] . Since then several schemes have been proposed. The first schemes were homomorphic only for linear functions over vector spaces [3-5, 12, 14, 16-18,22,24, 35] and have nice applications to network coding and proofs of retrievability. More recent works proposed realizations that can support more expressive functionalities such as polynomials [11, 20] or general circuits of bounded polynomial depth [15, 26] .
Despite the significant research work in the area, it is striking that all the existing homomor phic signature schemes that are proven secure in the standard model [3-5, 15-17,20,22,26,35] suffer from a public key that is at least linear in the size N of the signed datasets. On one hand, the cost of storing such large public key can be, in principle, amortized since the key can be re-used for multiple datasets. On the other hand, this limitation still represents a chal lenging open question from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. From a practical perspective, a linear public key might be simply unaffordable by a user Bob who has limited storage capacity. From a theoretical point of view, considered the state-of-the-art, it seems unclear whether achieving a standard-model scheme with a key of length o (N ) is possible at all. Technically speaking, indeed, all these schemes in the standard model somehow rely on a public key as large as one dataset for simulation purposes. This essentially hints that any solution for this problem would require a novel proof strategy.
Our contribution We solve the above open problem by proposing the first standard-model homomorphic signature scheme that achieves a public key whose size is sub-linear in the maximal size N of the supported datasets; moreover, our scheme is context-hiding secure. Slightly more in detail, we show how to use APHFs in a generic fashion to construct a linearly-homomorphic signature scheme based on bilinear maps that can sign datasets, each consisting of up to N vectors of dimension T . The public key of our scheme mainly consists of the public hash keys of two APHFs. By instantiating these using (one of) our concrete realiza tions we obtain a linearly-homomorphic signature with a public key of length O ( \/N + s /T ). We stress that ours is also the first linearly-homomorphic scheme where the public key is sub-linear in the dimension T of the signed vectors. Concretely, if one considers applications with datasets of 1 million of elements and a security parameter of 128 bits, previous solutions (e.g., [4, 17] ) require a public key of at least 32 MB, whereas our solution simply works with a public key below 100 KB.
On the power o f secretly-computable PHFs
The main technical idea underlying this result is a new proof technique that builds on asymmetric hash functions with programmable pseudorandomness. We illustrate the technique via a toy example inspired by our linearlyhomomorphic signature scheme. The scheme works over asymmetric bilinear groups Gx, G2, and with an APHF H : [N ] ^ G1 that has programmable pseudorandomness w.r.t. d = 1. To sign a random message M e G 1 w.r.t. a label t , one creates the signature
S = (H(t) • M)1/z
where z is the secret key. The signature is linearly-homomorphic -S1S2 = (H (t1 ) H (t2 ) M)1/z, for M = M1 M2 -and it can be efficiently checked using a pairing -e(S, g2) = Hi e(H(Ti), gf)e(M, g2) -and by relying on that e(H(), g2) is publicly computable.
The first interesting thing to note is that having H secretly computable is necessary: if H is public the scheme could be easily broken, e.g., choose M * = H(t) -1. Let us now show how to prove its security assuming that we want to do a reduction to the following assumption: given g1, g2, g2, the challenge is to compute Wl/z e G1 for W = 1 of adversarial choice. Missing g\ seems to make hard the simulation of signatures since M, S e G1. However, we can use the trapdoor generation of H for d = 1 (that for asymmetric pairings takes g1, h1 = gy1, g2, h2 = g |2 and allows to express H(X) = g^(y1,y2)), by plugging h1 = 1, h2 = g2. This allows to write every output as H(t) = = g^'0^'1 z. Every signing query with label t is simulated by setting Mt = g-ct'0 and St = (gf '1) . The signature is correctly distributed since (1) St = (H(t ) • Mt ) 1/z, and (2) Mt looks random thanks to the programmable pseudorandomness of H. To conclude the proof, assume that the adversary comes up with a forgery M*, S* for label t * such that t * was already queried, and let S, Mbe the values in the simulation of the signing query for t *. Now, S = (H(t *) • M)1/z holds by correctness, while S* = (H(t *) • M*)1/z holds for M* = M by definition of forgery. Then (M*/M, S*/S) is clearly a solution to the above assumption. This essentially shows that we can sign as many M 's as the number of t 's, that is N. And by using our construction H = Hsqrt this is achievable with a key of length O (\/~N). Let us stress that the above one is an incomplete proof sketch, that we give only to illustrate the core ideas of using programmable pseudorandomness. Moreover, note that the one presented above is only one of the possible cases of a forgery, but we think that it is the most interesting one to be considered in our example. We defer the reader to Sect. 4 for a precise description of our signature scheme and its security proof. Short signatures from bilinear maps in the standard model Hofheinz and Kiltz [30] proposed efficient realizations of PHFs, and showed how to use them to obtain black-box proofs of several cryptographic primitives. Among these applications, they use PHFs to build generic, standard-model, signature schemes from the Strong RSA problem and the Strong q -Diffie-Hellman problem. Somewhat interestingly, these schemes (in particular the ones over bilinear groups) can enjoy very short signatures. The remarkable contribution of the generic construction in [30] is that signatures can be made short by reducing the size p of the randomness used (and included) in the signature so that p can go beyond the birthday bound. Precisely, by using an (m , 1)-programmable hash function, m can control the size of the randomness so that the larger is m , the smaller is the randomness. However, although this would call for (m, 1)-PHFs with a large m, the original work [30] described PHFs realizations that are only (2, 1)-programmable. 3 Later, Hofheinz et al. [32] showed constructions of (m, 1)-PHFs for any m > 1. By choosing a larger m , these new PHFs realizations yield the shortest known signatures in the standard model. On the negative side, however, this also induces much larger public keys. For instance, to obtain a signature of 302 bits from bilinear maps, they need a public key of more than 8MB. The reason of such inefficiency is that their realizations of (deterministic) (m, 1)-PHFs have keys of length O (m2£), where £ is the bit size of the inputs. In a subsequent work, Yamada et al. [39] improved on this aspect by proposing a signature scheme with a public key of length O (m\[£). Their solution followed a different approach: instead of relying on (m, 1)-PHFs they obtained the signature by applying the Naor's transformation [8] to a new identity-based key encapsulation mechanism (IBKEM).
Our results Our results are mainly two. First, we revisit the generic signature constructions of [30, 32] in order to work with (m, 1, d )-APHFs. Our generic construction is very similar to that in [30, 32] , and, as such, it inherits the same property: the larger is m , the shorter can be the randomness.
Second we show the construction of an APHF, Hacfs, that is (m, 1, 2)-programmable and has a hash key consisting of O ( m /£ ) group elements. By plugging Hacfs into our generic construction we immediately obtain standard-model signatures that achieve the same efficiency as the scheme of Yamada et al. [39] . Namely, they are the shortest standard model signature schemes with a public key of length O (m \/£ ), that concretely allows for signatures of 302bits and a public key of 50KB. One of our two schemes recover the one in [39] . In this sense we provide a different conceptual approach to construct such signatures. While Yamada et al. obtained this result by going through an IBKEM, our solution revisits the original Hofheinz-Kiltz's idea of applying programmable functions.
We provide a detailed comparison of the schemes in Table 1 .
O th e r related w ork
Hanaoka et al. [28] show that there cannot be any black-box construction of a (poly, 1)-PHF. The latter result has been overcome by the recent work of Freire et al. [23] who propose a 
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The shown values consider: (i) security at both X = 80 and X = 128 against adversaries seeing up to q = 230 signatures; (ii) an implementation with Type-III pairings where |Gi | = p = 2X and |(&2 | = 2|G i |; (iii) messages of 2X bits so as to provide collision-resistance for X bits of security; (iv) the size of the randomness p = log q + [ -1 according to the analysis in [30] . We considered an implementation of Waters' scheme which optimizes the signature size. Above Exp denotes the cost of an exponentiation in G y The grey rows point out the results from this paper (poly, 1)-PHF based on multilinear maps slightly changing the definition of PHFs in order to work in the multilinear group setting. Their (poly, 1)-PHF leads to several applications, notably standard-model versions (over multilinear groups) of BLS signatures, the BonehFranklin IBE, and identity-based non-interactive key-exchange. While the notion of PHFs in the multilinear setting of [23] is different from our APHFs (with the main difference being that ours are secretly computable), it is worth noting that the two notions have some relation. As we discuss in Sect. 3.1, our APHFs indeed imply PHFs in the bilinear setting (though carrying the same degree of programmability). The idea of using bilinear maps to reduce the size of public keys was used previously by Haralambiev et al. [29] in the context of public-key encryption, and by Yamada et al. [39] in the context of digital signatures. We note that our solutions use a similar approach in the construction of APHFs, which however also include the important novelty of programmable pseudorandomness, that turned out to be crucial in our proofs for the linearly-homomorphic signature.
With respect to programmable hash functions, it is also worth to mention the recent work of Zhang et al. [41] which proposes PHFs based on lattices and uses them to build short signatures and IBEs with short key size.
Our work is also related to the research line on linearly-homomorphic structure preserving signatures (LHSPS). Structure preserving signatures (SPSs) are a particular kind of crypto graphic signatures in which messages, public key elements and signatures are all elements of a group over which there exists an efficiently computable bilinear map. In [35] , Libert et al. introduced structure preserving signatures with linearly homomorphic properties: a bit more in detail, these signature schemes act exactly as other linearly homomorphic signatures, with the additional restriction that, as in SPSs, signatures and messages are vectors of group elements and the linearly homomorphic property holds with respect to the group operation. Moreover, the model adopted by works on LHSPSs is slightly different from the one of linearly-homomorphic signatures (as defined in [11, 22] and used in this paper). In LHSPSs one signs vectors along with a vector identifier, and security is defined so that an output by an adversary is considered a forgery if it consists of a valid signature on a vector which does not belong to the linear span of originally signed vectors. It is known that a LHSPS (following this model) could be used to construct a scheme that signs messages (which can also be vectors) in a dataset, as in the model considered by this paper: given a vector v; at position i , one uses the LHSPS to sign the vector of group elements gui where u ; = e; ||v;, with e; the i-th column of the identity matrix. However, since in all existing LHSPSs (in the standard model) the size of the public key is linear in the dimension of the signed vectors, using LHSPSs yields solutions with a public key linear in the dataset size. On the other hand, it remains an open problem to design a LHSPS whose public key is sub-linear in the dimension of the signed vectors. Indeed, our techniques for reducing the public key size do not seem to work in the structure-preserving setting due to the fact that messages are group elements whose discrete logarithms are not known.
P ublication note an d organization
This article is based on an earlier one [19] which appears in the proceedings of CRYPTO 2015. Besides including proofs and details that were missing from [19] , in this version we added new results related to the context-hiding security of the proposed linearly-homomorphic signature scheme. More precisely, in this version we add a definition of context-hiding security, we propose a slightly modified version of our linearly-homomorphic scheme in [19] , and we show that this scheme is also context-hiding secure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the preliminary notions which are necessary in order to understand our work, such as bilinear groups and the complexity assumptions that we use to prove the security of our schemes. Section 3 is about the new concept of APHFs: we give definitions and propose two constructions of APHFs. Section 4 contains our results on linearly-homomorphic signatures: we recall their definition and then propose our construction and prove its security (including context hiding). Section 5 includes our results on short standard-model signatures. Finally, we defer the reader to the "Appendix" for the standard definition of digital signatures and an analysis of the proposed constant-size FDHI assumption.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review the notation and some basic definitions that we use in our work.
Notation We denote with X e N a security parameter. We say that a function e is negligible $ if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. If S is a set, x -S denotes the process $ of selecting x uniformly at random in S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, x -A(-) denotes the process of running A on some appropriate input and assigning its output to x . Moreover, for a positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1,..., n}. Additionally, sometimes we will use a compact notation ga, for a group element g e G and a vector a = (a\,...,at) e Z p, meaning the vector of group elements (ga1,..., ga').
B ilinear groups an d com plexity assum ptions
Let X e N be a security parameter and let G(1X) be an algorithm which takes as input the security parameter and outputs the description of (asymmetric) bilinear groups bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , e, g 1 , g2) where G1, G2 and G t are groups of the same prime order p > 2X, g1 e G1 and g2 e G2 are two generators, and e : G1 XG2 ^ G t is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate, bilinear map, and there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between G1 and G2. We call such an algorithm G a bilinear group generator. In the case G1 = G2, the groups are said symmetric, else they are said asymmetric.
In our work we rely on specific computational and decisional assumptions in such bilinear groups.
Definition 1 (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman [10] ) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilinear groups, let bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , g1, g2, e) --G(1X) where gx, g2 are two random gener ators, and let q = poly(X). We say that the q-Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (q-SDH) is e-hard for G if, for every PPT adversary A ,
Definition 2 (q-Diffie-Hellman inversion [9, 36] ) Let G be a generator of asymmetric bilin ear groups, let bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , g1, g2, e) --G(1X) where g1, g2 are two random generators, and let q = poly(X). We say that the q-Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption (q-DHI) is e-hard for G if, for every PPT adversary A ,
It is not hard to see that the above problem is equivalent to the one in which the adversary is ?q+1 given the same input and is challenged to compute the "next power" g1 .
A weaker variant of the q-DHI assumption that we use in some of our proofs is the one in which the adversary receives only g2, g2 in the group G2. For coherence with [32] 
Asymmetric programmable hash functions
In this section we present our new notion of asymmetric programmable hash functions. Let bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , g1, g2, e) be a family of asymmetric bilinear groups induced by a bilinear group generator G(1k) for a security parameter X e N.4 An asymmetric group hash function H : X ^ G1 consists of three PPT algorithms (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval) working as follows:
H.Gen(1X, bgp) ^ (sek, pek): on input the security parameter X e N and a bilinear group description bgp, the PPT key generation algorithm outputs a (secret) evaluation key se k and a (public) eval uation key pek. H.PriEval(sek, X ) ^ Y e G 1: given the secret evaluation key se k and an input X e X , the deterministic evaluation algorithm returns an output Y = H( X ) e G 1. H.PubEval(pek, X ) ^ Y e G t : on input the public evaluation key pek and an input X e X , the public evaluation algorithm outputs a value Y e G t such that Y = e(H(X), g2).
For asymmetric hash functions satisfying the syntax described above, we define two different properties that model their possible programmability.
The first property is a generalization of the notion of programmable hash functions of [30, 31] to our asymmetric setting (i.e., where the function is only secretly-computatble), and Syntax:
to the more specific setting of bilinear groups. The basic idea is that it is possible to generate the function in a trapdoor-mode that allows one to express every output of H in relation to some specified group elements. In particular, the most useful fact of programmability is that for two arbitrary disjoint sets of inputs X , Z C X , the joint probability that some of these group elements appear in H(Z), VZ e Z and do not appear in H(X ), VX e X is significant. H .T rapG en(1\ bgp, gx, h 1, g2, h2) ^ (td, pek) takes as input the security parameter X, bilinear group description bgp and group elements gx, h 1 e Gx, g2, h2 e G2, and it generates a public hash key pek along with a trapdoor td. H.TrapEval(td, X) ^ cx takes as input the trapdoor information td and an input X e X , and outputs a vector of integer coef ficients cx = (co,...,cd>) e Zd of a 2-variate polynomial cx (yi, y2) of degree < d. For all group elements gi, h 1 e G i, g2, h2 e G2 such that h 1 = gyi and h2 = gy2 for some y1, y2 e Z p, for all trapdoor keys (td, pek) -H.TrapGen(1X, g1 , h 1, g2 , h2), and for all inputs X e X ,i f c x -H H( X) = gJX (y1 'y2)
For all generators g1, h 1 e G1, g2, h2 e G2 and for all (sek, pek) --H.Gen(1X), (td, pek') --H.TrapGen (1X, g1, h 1 , g2 , h2), the distribution of the public keys pek and pek' is within statistical distance
Y.
For all g1, h 1 e G1, g2, h2 e G2, all keys (td, pek) --H.TrapGen(1X, g1, h 1, g2, h2) , and all inputs X 1,..., Xm e X and Z1,..., Zn e X such that Xi = Zj for all i, j , we have , cZn,0 = 0 ] > S where cxt -H.TrapEval(td, Xi) and CZj -H. TrapEval(td, Zj), and cxt,0 (resp. cZj,0) is the coef ficient of the term of degree 0. The probability is over the trapdoor td that was produced along with pek. Program m able pseudorandomness The second main programmability property that we define for asymmetric hash functions is quite different from the previous one. It is called programmable pseudorandomness, and very intuitively it says that, when using the hash function in trapdoor mode, it is possible to "embed" a PRF into it. More precisely, the trapdoor algorithms satisfy programmable pseudorandomness if they allow to generate keys such that even by observing pek and H(X ) for a bunch of inputs X , then the elements g^'0 look random. The formal definition follows: Pseudorandomness: Let b e {0, 1} and let Exp^Rj*-b(X) be the following experiment between an adversary A and a challenger.
1. Generate bgp --5(1X), andrun A (bgp), that outputs two generators h1 e G^ h2 e G2.
2. Compute (td, pek) -H.TrapGen(1A, g 1 , h^ g2, h2) and run A(pek) with access to the following oracle:
(-) that on input X e X returns H(X) = gCX(yuy2) and gr 1X, $ for a randomly chosen ix -Z p (which is unique for every X e X ).
3. At the end the adversary outputs a bit b' , and b' is returned as the output of the experiment.
Then we say that H.TrapGen, H.TrapEval satisfy pseudorandomness for e, if for all PPT A
where the probabilities are taken over all the random choices of TrapGen, the oracle R and the adversary A .
Remark 1 (On the mutual existence of programmability and programmable pseudorandom ness) We stress that the two properties of programmability and programmable pseudoran domness defined above are mutually exclusive. Precisely, an APHF can have a pair of trapdoor algorithms (TrapGen, TrapEval) that admits either (m, n, d ' / '^-programmability (for non-negligible S), or (d, y, e)-programmable pseudorandomness (for negligible e). Intu itively, the reason why the same trapdoor algorithms cannot satisfy both properties is that (m, n,S, y)-programmability implies that for any elements X 1 ,..., Xm e X it holds cXi,0 = 0 with non negligible probability S. However, if this holds then programmable pseu dorandomness can be trivially broken, since g 1Xi ,0 = 1 with non negligible probability S.
On the other hand, it is quite interesting to observe that the same function can enjoy both properties through different, appropriate, pairs of trapdoor algorithms. In fact, an asym metric group hash function can have a pair of trapdoor algorithms (TrapGen, TrapEval) for which (m, n,S, y)-programmability holds, and another pair of trapdoor algorithms (TrapGen', TrapEval') for which (d, y, S)-programmable pseudorandomness holds. Then, since all trapdoor generations produce keys that are statistically indistinguishable from the real ones it follows that also the two trapdoor modes are statistically indistinguishable. In a nutshell, this means that the same function can be programmed in different modes in different steps of a security proof, a property which turns out to be very useful, for example, in our proofs of Sect. 4.4.
O ther variants of program m ability Here we define two other variants of the programma bility notion given in Definition 5.
Weak programmability We consider a weak version of the above programmability property in which one fixes at key generation time the n inputs Z j on which cZj,0 = 0. -Syntax: H.TrapGen(1X, bgp, gi, h 1, g2, h2, Z 1,..., Z n) ^ (td, pek) takes as input the security parameter X, bilinear group description bgp, group elements gi, h 1 e G i, g2, h 2 e G2, and a set of n inputs Z 1,..., Z n e X .It generates a public hash key pek along with a trapdoor td. H.TrapEval(td, X ) ^ cx works exactly as in Defini tion 5. -The properties of correctness and statistically-close trapdoor keys hold as in Defini tion 5. The property of well-distributed logarithms is also the same except that the inputs Z1,..., Z n are the ones fixed as input to H.TrapGen.
Degree-d programmability
In our work we also consider a variant of the above definition in which the property of well distributed logarithms is stated with respect to the degree d coefficients of the polynomials generated by H.TrapEval. In this case, we say that H is
R elation w ith existing notions
Before describing our realizations of APHFs, we discuss here the relation between our new notion and two existing notions of programmable hash functions: the original one by Hofheinz and Kiltz [30] , recalled in "Appendix C", and its adaptation to the multilinear setting recently proposed by Freire et al. [23] .
When working over bilinear groups, the notion of programmable hash functions of [30] is essentially a special case of ours. The main differences are: (1) PHFs are publicly computable, (2) the trapdoor algorithms work with only two generators g, h and every output of the function can be expressed as a linear function gahb of these two generators. As we formally state in the following theorem, a standard PHF is an APHF for d = 1: The proof is fairly easy. Here we provide a sketch. Basically, by assuming that H is pro grammable, we have to show two algorithms PHF.TrapGen, PHF.TrapEval that satisfy the programmability of H in the bilinear setting:
H.TrapGen(1A, g, h) and output (td, pek). PHF.TrapEval(td, X): run cX^H .T rapE val(td, X) to generate the coefficient of a degree-2 polynomial cX(y) where y = DLogg(h). Then output aX = cx,0, and Bx = gcX,1 hcX,2.
It is easy to see that if cx is such that H(X ) = gcx,°+cx,1 y+cxay2 then H(X) = e(H(X), g) = e(g, g)cx,°e(gcx,1+cx,2y, g y) = e(g, g)axe(Bx, h)

Finally, the (m, n, y, 8)-programmability of H is immediately implied by the well distribution of the discrete logarithms in H for parameters (m, n, 2, y, 8).
3.2 A n asym m etric p ro g ram m ab le hash function based on cover-free sets
In this section we present the construction of an asymmetric hash function, Hacfs, based on cover-free sets. Our construction uses ideas similar to the ones used by Hofheinz, Jager and Kiltz [32] to design a (regular) programmable hash function. Our construction extends these ideas with a technique that allows us to obtain a much shorter public key. Concretely, for binary inputs of size t , the programmable hash function Hcfs in [32] is (m, 1)-programmable with a hash key of length O (tm2). In contrast, our new construction Hacfs is (m, 1)-programmable with a hash key of length O (m \ft). While such improvement is obtained at the price of obtaining the function in the secret-key model, our results of Sect. 5 show that asymmetric programmable hash are still useful to build short bilinear-map signatures, whose efficiency, in terms of signature's and key's length matches that of state-of-the-art schemes [39] . Before proceeding with describing our function, below we recall the notion of cover-free sets.
Cover-free families If S, V are sets, we say that S does not cover V if S ^ V . Let T , m, s be positive integers, and let F = {Fi} e[s] be a family of subsets of [T] . A family F is said to be m-cover-free over [T], if for any subset I C [s] of cardinality at most m, then the union U eiFi does not cover Fj for all j e I . More formally, for any I C [s] such that 11 1 < m , and any j e I , U ei F; ^ F j. Furthermore, we say that F is w-uniformif every subset Fi in the family have size w. In our construction, we use the following fact from [21, 34] :
34] There is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm that, on input integers s = 2t and m, returns w, T, F where F = {Fi} e[s] is a w-uniform, m-cover-free family over [T],for w = T/4m and T < 16m2t.
The construction o f Hacfs Let Q(1X) be a bilinear group generator, let bgp = (p, G i, G2, Gt , gi, g2, e) be an instance of bilinear group parameters generated by Q. Let t = t(X) and m = m (X) be two polynomials in the security parameter. We set s = 2t, T = 16m21, and w = T/4m as for Lemma 1, and define t = f\/T "|. In the following we describe the asymmetric hash function Hacfs = (H.Gen, H.PriEval, H.PubEval) that maps Hacfs : X ^ G1 where X = {0, 1}t . In particular, every input X e {0, 1}t is associated to a set Fi, i e [2t ], by interpreting X as an integer in {0, and by setting i = X + 1. We call Fx such subset associated to X . , 2t -1 } H.Gen(1X, bgp):
H.PubEval(pek, X):
for i = 1 to t, sample ai, fri -Z p and compute Ai = g^, Bi = g f . Finally, set se k = {ai }t=1, pek = {Ai, Bi }t=1, and return (sek, pek). first, compute the subset Fx Q [T] associated to X e {0, 1}£, and then return
be the subset associated to X , and compute 
= e(Ai, Bj) = e(H(X), g2) (i,j )e Fx
where every ai (y1) (resp. frj (y2)) is the discrete log arithm of Ai (resp. B j) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed as a degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp. y2). Now, we show that the two trapdoor algorithms described above satisfy the four properties of Definition 5. First, syntax and correctness immediately follow by construction. Second, observe that each element Ai (resp. Bj ) in pek is a uniformly distributed group element in Gi (resp. G2), exactly as in the output of H.Gen, hence y = 0. Third, we show that the algorithms allow for well distributed logarithms for the case n = 1. Let X 1 ,..., Xm, Z e X such that Z = Xi for all i. From the m-cover-free property of F we have that there exist an index r ' e Fz such that r ' e Fxt .S in cer is chosen uniformly at random in [T ],wehave that r = r' with probability S = 1/T . Now, assume that r' = r = (i*, j *) e for all (i, j ) = (i*, j *) it holds that the degree-0 coefficient of c(y1 , y2) = ai (y{)Pj (y2) is C0 = 0, whereas for (i *, j *) the degree-0 coefficient of c* (y1 , y2) = ai * (y{)Pj * (y2) = (ai*y1 + 1)(bj*y2 + 1), is c* = 1. Therefore, we have that cxt,0 = 0, Vi e [m] and cz,0 = 1 holds with probability S. First, it is easy to see that the two algorithms satisfy the syntax and correctness properties. Also, in the case hx = 1 (i.e., yx = 0) or hx = gx (i.e., yx = 1), we obtain a degree-1 polynomial cx (y2). Second, observe that each element Ai (resp. Bj) in pek is a uniformly distributed group element in Gx (resp. G2), as in H.Gen, hence y = 0. Third, we show that the function satisfies the pseudorandomness property under the assumption that XDDH holds in Gx. The main observation is that for every X = (i, j ), we have cx,o = ajbj where all the values bj are uniformly distributed and information-theoretically hidden to an adversary who only sees pek. In particular, this holds even if hx = 1.
To prove the pseudorandomness we make use of Lemma 2 below, which shows that for a uniformly random choice of a, b --Z p , c --Zpxt the distributions g , g^7) e Gt xx ( +x) and (ga, g ' C) e G < [x(t+x) are computationally indistinguishable.
Lemma 2 Let a, b -Z p , c -Zpxt be chosen uniformly at random. I f the XDDH assump tion is e '-hard in Gx, then fo r any PPT B it holds
We first show how to use Lemma 2 to prove that Hsqrt has programmable pseudorandom ness. The proof of Lemma 2 appears slightly below.
Let A be an adversary that breaks the e-programmable pseudorandomness of Hsqrt. We construct a simulator B that can distinguish the two distributions (ga, ga bT) and (ga, g< [) described above with advantage greater than e . B 's input is a tuple (A', C) e G^ x G t 1Kt and its goal is to decide about the distribution of C . First, B runs A(bgp) which outputs the generators hx, h2. B then samples two random vectors r, j --Z p, computes B = gij e G2, A = h \ • A ' e G j, sets pek = (A, B), and runs A(pek) Next, for every oracle query (i, j ) made by A, B simulates the answer by returning to A: H (i, j ) = A and Ci, j . It is easy to see that if C = ga bT then B is perfectly simulating Exp^jHq^, otherwise, if C is random and independent, then B is simulating E x p^H^. As a final note, we observe that the above proof works even in the case hx = 1. □ 
Proof (Proof o f Lemma
We complete the proof of Lemma 2 by showing the following claim: As one can check, if given X = (i, j ), return the coefficients of the degree-2 polynomial
where ai (y1) (resp. fj (y2)) is the discrete logarithm of Ai (resp. Bj) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed as a degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp. y2).
Syntax and correctness are easily seen by inspection. The public key generatedby H.TrapGen is distributed identically to the one generated by H. G en, from which y = 0. Also, it is clear from the construction that for Z = (i *, j *) we have cz (y1, y2) = (y1r1 + 1)(y2sj + 1), and thus c z ,0 = 1, whereas for every X = Z the degree-0 term of the polynomial cz (y1, y2) computed by H.TrapEval is always 0. And this holds with probability 8 = 1. □ Weak (poly, 1, 2)-degree-2-programmability of Hsqrt Finally, we prove that Hsqrt is also weakly (poly, 1, 2, y, 8)-degree-2-programmable for y = 0 and 8 = 1.
Theorem 7
The asymmetric hash function Hsqrt described above is weakly (poly, 1, d , y, 8 Proof The proof of this theorem can be seen as the "dual" version of the one of Theorem 6. Instead of setting the simulated keys so that Z is the only input for which cz,0 = 1, here the keys are simulated in such a way that Z is the only input in which the term y 1 y2 appears. More precisely, the trapdoor algorithms work as follows: where ai (y1) (resp. f j (y2)) is the discrete logarithm of Ai (resp. Bj ) in base g1 (resp. g2), viewed as a degree-1 polynomial in the unknown y1 (resp. y2).
Syntax and correctness are easily seen by inspection. The public key generatedby H.TrapGen is distributed identically to the one generatedby H.Gen, from which y = 0. By construction, we have that for Z = (i*, j *), c z (yi, y2) = (ri + yi)(sj + y2), and thus c z ,2 = 1, whereas for every X = Z the polynomial cx (y i, y2) has degree < 1, and thus cx ,2 = 0. This property holds with probability S = 1. □
Linearly-homomorphic signatures with short public keys
In this section, we show a new linearly-homomorphic signature scheme that uses APHFs in a generic way. By instantiating the APHFs with our construction Hsqrt given in Sect. 3, we obtain the first linearly-homomorphic signature scheme that is secure in the standard model, and whose public key has a size that is sub-linear in both the dataset size and the dimension of the signed vectors. Precisely, if the signature scheme supports datasets of maximal size N and can sign vectors of dimension T , then the public key of our scheme is of size O (s/N + \ / T ). All previously existing constructions in the standard model achieved only public keys of length O (N + T ). Furthermore, our scheme is adaptive secure and achieves the interesting property of efficient verification that allows to use the scheme for verifiable delegation of computation in the preprocessing model [20] . Before describing our scheme, in the next section we recall the definition of homomorphic signatures.
H om om orphic signatures for m ulti-labeled p rogram s
In this section we recall the definition of homomorphic signatures as presented in [20] . This definition extends the one by Freeman in [22] in order to work with the general notion of multi-labeled programs [6, 25] .
Multi-labeled program s A labeled program P is a tuple (f,Ti,..., Tn) such that f : M n ^ M is a function of n variables (e.g., a circuit) and Ti e {0, 1}* is a label of the i-th input of f . Labeled programs can be composed as follows: given P i,...,P t and a function g : M t ^ M, the composed program P * is the one obtained by evaluating g on the outputs of Pi,...,P t, and it is denoted as P * = g(Pi,..., Pt). The labeled inputs of P * are all the distinct labeled inputs of P i,...P t (all the inputs with the same label are grouped together and considered as a unique input of P *).
Let fid : M ^ M be the identity function and t e {0, i}* be any label. We refer to I T = (fid, t) as the identity program with label t . Note that a program P = (f,Ti,...,Tn) can be expressed as the composition of n identity programs P = f ( I Ti ,...,lTn ).
A multi-labeled program P a is a pair (P , A) in which P = (f,Ti,...,Tn) is a labeled program while A e {0, i}* is a data set identifier. Multi-labeled programs can be composed within the same data set in the most natural way: given (P i, A ) ,..., (Pt, A) which has the same data set identifier A, and given a function g : M t ^ M, the composed multi-labeled program PA is the pair (P*, A) where P * is the composed program g(Pi, ..., Pt), and A is the common data set identifier for all the Pi . As for labeled programs, one can define the notion of a multi-labeled identity program as I(a,t) = ((fid, t), A). , f , a) the key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter X, the description of the label space L (which fixes the maximum data set size N), and outputs a public key vk and a secret key sk. The public key vk defines implicitly a message space M and a set F of admissible functions. the signing algorithm takes as input a secret key sk, a data set identifier A, a label t e L a message m e M , and it outputs a signature a . the verification algorithm takes as input a public key vk, a multi labeled program Pa = ((f, T1 ,...,t" ), A) with f e F , a message m e M, and a signature a . It outputs either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). the evaluation algorithm takes as input a public vk, a function f e F and a tuple of signatures {ai }"= 1 (assuming that f takes n inputs). It outputs a new signature a .
Below we describe the four properties mentioned above:
Authentication correctness Intuitively, a homomorphic signature scheme has authen tication correctness if the signature generated by Sign , g, (ax,..., at) ), then Ver (vk, P *, m*, a*) = 1 holds with all but negligible probability.
Succintness A homomorphic signature scheme is said to be succint if, for a fixed security parameter X, the size of signatures depends at most logarithmically on the data set size N .
Security To define the security notion of homomorphic signatures we define the following experiment HomUF-CMA^,HomSign(X) between an adversary A and a challenger C:
Key generation Signing queries
Forgery C runs (vk, sk) -KeyGen(1X, L) and gives vk to A. A can adaptively submit queries of the form (A, t, m) , where A is a data set identifier, t e L, and m e M . The challenger C proceeds as follows: if (A, t, m ) is the first query with the data set identifier A, the challenger initializes an empty list Ta = 0 for A. If Ta does not already contain a tuple (t, ■) (which means that A never asked for a query (A , t, ■)), the challenger C computes a -Sign (sk, A , t, m) , returns a to A and updates the list Ta -Ta U (t, m). If (t, m ) e Ta (which means that the adversary had already queried the tuple (A , t, m) ), then C replies with the same signature generated before. If To define what is a forgery in such a game we recall the notion of well defined program with respect to a list Ta [20] . Intuitively, the first case says that the challenger has generated signatures for the entire input space of f for the data set A*, while the second one means that the inputs that were not signed during the experiment do not contribute to the result of f .
Using this notion, it is then possible to define the three different types of forgeries that can occur in the experiment HomUF-CMA:
Type 1: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = la n d th e list Ta * was not initialized during the game (i.e., no message was ever signed w.r.t. data set identifier A*). Type 2: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = 1, P* is well defined with respect to Ta* and m* = f *({mj}(T j,m,)eTA*) (i.e., m* is not the correct output of P * when executed over previously signed messages). Type3: Ver (vk, PA*, m*,a*) = 1 and P* is not well defined with respect to Ta* .
Then we say that HSig is a secure homomorphic signature if for any PPT adversary A, we have that Pr[HomUF-CMA^,H0mSign(^) = 1 ]< c(L) where e(X) is a negligible function.
We recall that, as proved by Freeman in [22] , in a linearly-homomorphic signature scheme any adversary who outputs a Type 3 forgery can be converted into one that outputs a Type 2 one.
Proposition 1 ([22]) Let HSig be a linearly homomorphic signature scheme with message space M C R n fo r some ring R . I f HSig is secure against Type 2 forgeries, then HSig is secure against Type 3 forgeries.
Homomorphic signatures with efficient verification We recall the notion of homomor phic signatures with efficient verification introduced in [20] . The property states that the verification algorithm can be split in two phases: an offline phase where, given the verifica tion key vk and a labeled program P , one precomputes a concise key v k p ;an online phase in which vkp can be used to verify signatures w.r.t. P and any dataset A . To achieve (amortized) efficiency, the idea is that vkp can be reused an unbounded number of times, and the online verification is cheaper than running P . Below is the formal definition.
Definition 10 Let HSig = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver, Eval) be a homomorphic signature scheme for multi-labeled programs. HSig satisfies efficient verification if there exist two additional algorithms (VerPrep, EffVer) such that:
VerPrep(vk, P ):
on input the verification key vk and a labeled program P = (f , T 1 ,...,Tn), this algorithm generates a concise verification key v k p . We stress that this verification key does not depend on any data set identifier A .
EffVer(vkp, A, m,a):
given a verification key v k p , a data set identifier A, a message m e M and a signature a , the efficient verification algorithm outputs 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). 
is t' = o(t (n)).
Context-hiding secure homomorphic signatures We recall and formalize the notion of context-hiding homomorphic signature. Intuitively, it states that a signature which certifies m as the output of a multi-labeled program Va = ((f,T1 ,. ..,Tn), A) does not reveal anything about the underlying data beyond the result of the computation. We give a simulation-based notion of security, requiring that a signature a can be simulated given knowledge of only the labeled program Va , its output m and the secret key sk, but without Va 's input. The simulated signature is required to be indistinguishable from one obtained by running the Eval algorithm to any distinguisher D that is also given a key pair (sk, vk), the label program Va and the signatures on the messages on which the program Va is evaluated. Essentially, this property says that a verifier, even with the knowledge of the secret key, cannot gain any information beyond what can be trivially inferred from the input of the verification algorithm. Remark 2 (On the hiding algorithms) We would like to remark that the Hide procedure is introduced to aim for generality of the above definition. However an explicit Hide procedure may not be necessary, i.e., there may be schemes where the evaluation algorithm already produces context-hiding signatures. In these cases, the above definition still applies as the Hide procedure can be simply the identity function, and HVerify can be the regular verification algorithm Ver.
Remark 3 (Relation with existing definitions) As a second remark, we note that context hiding security for homomorphic signatures has been considered in earlier works [2, 11, 26] with (slightly) different definitions. Compared to the weakly context-hiding notion of Boneh and Freeman [11] , ours is stronger in that it considers indistinguishability even when one knows the original signatures. The notion of Ahn et al. [2] is made for P -homomorphic signatures, where P are predicates. Although P -homomorphic signatures and the homomor phic signatures considered in this work are equivalent (cf. [26, footnote 1]), with respect to context-hiding our notion is slightly weaker as it requires context-hiding to be satisfied with the help of specific hiding algorithms. However, it is not hard to see that when a scheme satisfies context-hiding with trivial hiding algorithms (i.e., Hide is the identity function and HVerify = Ver), then it also satisfies the notion of [2] . Our definition above is inspired by that of [26] except for two main differences. First, in our case the simulator is explicitly given the circuit for which the signature is supposed to verify. This is in contrast to the definition in [26] where the simulator receives a value a output of a P rocess procedure, which can be seen as the equivalent of our VerPrep algorithm. With respect to this difference our definition is more general, and we stress that the circuit is not hidden in either of the two context-hiding notions. Second, our definition considers indistinguishability in the presence of the original signatures o i. Although including this information may not be necessary for schemes with a "powerful" hiding procedure, it allows for more generality. Finally, let us note that a dis advantage of using hiding algorithms is that after the application of Hide signatures may no longer be used in further homomorphic computation.
O u r construction
Let £ ' = (KeyGen', Sign', Ver') be a regular signature scheme, and F : K x{0, 1}* ^ Zp be a pseudorandom function with key space K. Our linearly-homomorphic signature scheme signs T -dimensional vectors of messages in Z p, supports datasets of size N , with both N = poly(X) and T = poly(X) and is context-hiding secure. Let KeyGen(1X, L, T ). Let X be the security parameter, L be a set of admissible labels where L = {1,..., N }, and T be an integer representing the dimension of the vectors to be signed. The key generation algorithm works as follows.
-Generate a key pair (vk', sk') --KeyGen'(1X) for the regular scheme.
-Run bgp --G(1X) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , g1, g2, e) where G1, G2 and G t are groups of prime order p ~ 2X, g1 e G1, g2 e G2 are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^ G t is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate bilinear map.
-Choose two random seeds K , K --K for the PRF F : K x{0, 1}* ^ Z p.
-Run (sek, pek) --H.Gen(1X, bgp) and (sek', pek') --H .Gen'(1X, bgp) to generate the keys of the asymmetric hash functions. -Return vk = (vk', bgp, pek, pek') and sk = (sk', K , K , sek, sek').
Sign(sk, A, t, m). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, a data set identifier
A e {0, 1}*,alabel t e [N ] and a message vector m e Zp ,andproceeds as follows:
1. Derive the integer z -Fk (A) using the PRF, and compute Z = g2. 2. Compute oa -S ign'(sk', A |Z ) to bind Z to the dataset identifier A.
Derive r -Fg (A | t), set R = and compute
S = T H.PriEval(sek, t) ■ R ■ ^[ H.PriEval/(sek/, j)mj j=1
1/z
Return a signature a = (oa , Z , R, S).
Essentially, the algorithm consists of two main steps. First, it uses the PRF Fk to derive a common parameter z which is related to the data set A, and it signs the public part, Z = g2, of this parameter using the signature scheme S '. Then it uses the same PRF Fg with a different seed K to create the pseudorandom element R = g p^4^. Second, it uses z to create the homomorphic component S of the signature, such that S is now related to all (A, t, m).
Eval(vk, f, a).
The public evaluation algorithm takes as input the public key vk, a linear function f : Zp ^ Z p described by its vector of coefficients A,m ,a) . The online verification is the same as Ver except that in the verifica tion equation the value H has been already computed in the off-line phase (and is included in v k p ).
Clearly, running the combination of VerPrep and EffVer gives the same result as running Ver, and EffVer's running time is independent off 's complexity t.
We formally show the correctness of our homomorphic signature scheme in Sect. 4.3. The following theorems state the security and context-hiding of our scheme. Their proofs appear in Sects. 4.4 and 4.5 respectively. (1, y , e)-programmablepseudorandomness; H' is weakly (poly, 1, 2, y ' , S')-programmable  and (poly, 0, 1, y ', S') We note that for the sake of context-hiding in our scheme there are no specific hiding algo rithms (i.e., one can see Hide as the identity function and HVerify as Ver). In other words the signing and the evaluation algorithms already produce signatures with context-hiding.
Theorem 8 (Unforgeability of HSig) Assume that S ' is an unforgeable signature scheme, F is a pseudorandom function, and G is a bilinear group generator such that: H has
Remark 4 (Alternative requirement for context-hiding) To prove context-hiding of our linearly-homomorphic signature scheme, in Theorem 9 we require the scheme S ' to be deterministic. It is worth mentioning that alternatively we could also prove context-hiding by requiring S ' to be re-randomizable and by giving an explicit Hide algorithm. In a few words,6 a signature scheme is re-randomizable if it comes with an additional algorithm R that on input a message m and a signature a outputs a new signature a which is indistin guishable from a fresh signature on m. If S ' is re-randomizable, then context-hiding can be achieved by letting Hide work as follows: instead of simply being the identity function, Hide takes a signature a = (aA, Z , R, S), applies the re-randomization algorithm on aa to obtain another signature cta on the message (A\Z), and outputs a = (aa , Z , R, S). This way the fresh signature aA created by the simulator will be indistinguishable from the one a a in the output of Hide. Proof Let (sk, vk) be a pair of honestly generated keys and let a -Sign(sk, A , t , m) be a honestly generated signature, with a = (aA, Z , Rt , St). In order to prove that the verification algorithm Ver (vk, I(a,t) The fact that oa verifies correctly for Z and A is immediate by correctness of S ' and by construction of Eval (which simply copies one of these honestly-generated signatures).
Since each oi verifies correctly, for every i = 1,...,I we have
Then, by the previous equations and the fact that H, H are asymmetric hash functions for bilinear groups, we obtain the desired equation:
P ro o f of security
To prove Theorem 8, we show that for every PPT adversary A running in the security experiment HomUF-CMA^ HSig, the probability that the experiment outputs 1 is negligible. We do the proof by describing a series of hybrid games. We write Gi (A) to denote the event that a run of Game i with adversary A returns 1. Some of the games use some flag values badi that are initially set to false. If at the end of a game any of these values is set to true, the game simply outputs 0. We call Badi the event that badi is set to true during the run of an experiment. Essentially, whenever an event Badi occurs in Game i, the game may deviate its outcome. Finally, we note that in the following proof we directly use the result of Proposition 1 so that we only have to deal with Type-1 and Type-2 forgeries, since Type-3 ones can be converted in Type-2.
Game 0 This game is the security experiment HomUF-CMA^ HSig (where A only outputs Type-1 or Type-2 forgeries). Game 1 This game is defined as Game 0 apart from the fact that whenever A returns a forgery a * = (a A, Z *, R*, S*) such that Z * was not generated by the challenger in the signing query phase, then Game 1 sets badx ^true. As we show in Lemma 3, any noticeable difference between Game 0 and Game 1 can be reduced to producing a forgery for the regular signature scheme S '. Furthermore, it is worth noting that after this change, the game never outputs 1 if the adversary returns a Type-1 forgery. Game 2 This game is defined as Game 1 except that the pseudorandomfunction F is replaced by a random function R : {0, 1}* ^ Z p. It is easy to see that Game 1 is compu tationally indistinguishable from Game 2 under the assumption that PRF.KG is pseudorandom. Game 3 is defined as Game 2 except for the following change. Let (P**, a*, m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary where P ** = (f * . In Lemma 7 we show that any adversary for which Bads occurs can be reduced to a solver for the 2-DHI problem. Game 6 proceeds as Game 5 with the following modification. At the very beginning, the $ challenger chooses the value zp -Z p that will be used to generate the signa tures for p-th dataset Ap. It sets Zp = gff. Second, instead of generating the key pek of the hash function H using H.Gen, the challenger runs (td, pek) -H.TrapGen(1X, bgp, gi, gi, g2, Zp) where H.TrapGen is the algorithm for which H has (1, y , e)-programmable pseudorandomness. Then the challenger uses td when it needs to compute H Q during the experiment. If H hash (1,y, A)-programmable pseudorandomness we immediately obtain that Game 5 and Game 6 are within statistical distance y , i.e., | Pr[G5(A)] -Pr[G6(A)]| < y . Game 7 This game is the same as Game 6, except that in the signing queries (A,t, m) such that A is the p-th distinct dataset queried by A, the challenger first computes cT -H.TrapEval(td, t) and then generates the signature component R t by setting Rt = g-Ct'0, instead of choosing Rt -G1 randomly as done up to Game 6. As we show in Lemma 8, Game 6 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 7 under the assumption that H has programmable pseudorandomness. Moreover, note that due to the previous modifications, Game 7 can output 1 only if the adversary outputs a forgery (P** , a *, m*) such that Ver (vk, P **, m*,a*) = 1 and m* = m and S* = S and R* = R . We conclude the proof by showing in Lemma 9 that an adversary that wins in Game 7 can be used to solve the FDHI problem (Definition 4).
We proceed with the proof by formally bounding the difference between each consecutive pair of games, and eventually the probability that an adversary wins in the last game. The proof of Theorem 8 is finally obtained by putting together all the bounds.
Lemma 3 For every PPT A there exists a PPTforger F such that Pr
Proof The two games differ only if B ad1 occurs in Game 1,i.e., | Pr[G0(A)] -Pr[G1(A)]| < P r[B ad J. However, by the construction of HSig, if Bad1 occurs, it means that the forgery returned by A includes a valid signature aa* on (A*|Z *) although no signature on (A*|-) was ever returned by the challenger during the experiment. It is straightforward to show that, for any such a PPT A, there exists a PPT forger algorithm F that breaks the unforgeability of the regular signature scheme E ', i.e., Pr[Bad1] <
Lemma 4 For every PPT A there exists a PPT distinguisher D such that | Pr[G 1(A)] -Pr[G2(A)] |< A dvP FR D(X).
Proof Game 1 and Game 2 differ just for the fact that the PRF F is replaced by a random function R . It is easy to do a reduction to the security of the PRF to show that for any adversary g1, g2, g{, g2) , and its goal is to compute g1 . Precisely, here we use the fact that this problem is equivalent to the 1-DHI problem in which the adversary has to compute g f . So, B proceeds as follows.
Setup:
B starts by sampling a random y --Zp and runs (td, pek) --H.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, g1, g2, g | ). Note that since B had set h1 = g1, the polynomials cx generated by H.TrapEval(td, X) will be univariate polynomials cx(y). Next, it chooses a random index v -- [T] , which represents a guess on the index where the message vector m* returned by the adversary in the forgery will differ from the "correct" result m .
Then B sets h1 = g\, h2 = g2 and runs the trapdoor generation (for weakly degree-2 programmability) of the asymmetric hash function H'
-(td', pek') --H'.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, h 1, g2, h2, v) -by providing v as the input on which the coefficient cv,2 = 0. Indeed, notice that by giving h1 = gl, h2 = g2 to H'.TrapGen, the polynomials generated H'.TrapEval(td', X ) will be univariate polynomials cx (z). Finally, the simulator generates the keys (sk', vk') of the scheme S ', sets vk = (vk', pek, pek'), stores sk', td, td', and returns vk to A. Signing queries: Let k -1 be a counter for the number of datasets queried by A. For every new queried dataset A, B creates a list Ta of tuples (t, m, a), which collects all the label/message pairs queried by the adversary on A, and the respectively generated signatures. Moreover, whenever the k-th $ new dataset Ak is queried, B samples a random % k -Z p, computes Zk = (g2) k and stores % k. Note that all the values {Zk}ke[g] are random in G2 and thus are distributed exactly as in Game 3. Given a signing query (A ,t, m) such that A = Ak is the k-th dataset, B proceeds as follows. First, it runs cT -H.TrapEval(td, t), and cj -H'.TrapEval(td', j ) for all j = 1 to T . If cj 2 = 0 then B continues the simulation as follows, otherwise it aborts. $ Therefore, B samples a random pT -Z p and computes
As one can see, the value RT is a uniformly distributed G i element as in Game 3. Moreover, ST is a correctly distributed signature since
T m S Finally, B returns to A the signature a = (a*, Z k, RT , ST), where a* -Sign(sk' , * |Z k ). Let (V**, a*, m*) be the forgery returned by the adversary. B proceeds exactly as the challenger in Game 3 in order to compute R , S , rn. If Bad3 occurs, since (V**, a * , m*) verifies correctly the following two equations hold
T e(S*\ Z ") = A ■ e(R*, g2)
where A = ]"[ te c* H.PubEval(pek, t) t . If we divide the two equations and consider that, by definition of Bad3, it holds S* = S, then we obtain
By correctness of the trapdoor algorithms of H' we know that H'( j ) = c'. +c' z+c' z2 g1j j j where cj ^ = 0 for all j = v (since B did not abort so far). If c'v 2 = 0 then B aborts, otherwise it continues as follows. How ever, notice that by the weak (poly , 1, 2 , y ', S') programmability of H' the event that cj ^ = 0 for all j = v and c'v ^ = 0 holds with probability S'. Therefore, B does not abort with probability S'. Furthermore, since the simulation provided to A until its forgery's output is distributed statisti cally close to the real execution of Game 3 (close by a factor y + y ' due to the use of TrapGen in H and H'), v is information-theoretically hidden to A . Hence, B takes as input a tuple (g i, g2, gl, g2, gl , g2 ), and its goal is to compute g^ B proceeds as follows.
. To do so
Setup:
B proceeds as the challenger in Game 5 by choosing a random index
. Second, B picks a random y ^ Z p and runs (td, pek) Ĥ .TrapGen(1k, bgp, gi, gi, g2, g2). Note that since B had set hi = gi, the polynomials cx generated by H.TrapEval(td, X) will be univari ate, degree-i, polynomials cx(y). Next, it chooses a random index $ v •< -[T], which represents a guess on the index where the message vector m* returned by the adversary in the forgery will differ from the "correct" result rn. It runs the trapdoor generation (for weak (poly, i, 2)-programmability) of the asymmetric hash function H' -(td', pek') -H '.T rapG en(ik, bgp, gi, gi, g2, g2, v) -providing v as the input on which the coefficient cv,o = 0. Notice that by giving hi = g\, h2 = g2 to H'.TrapGen, the polynomials generated H/.TrapEval(td/, X) will be univariate polynomials cx (z) = cx,o + cx,iz + cx,2z2. Finally, it generates the keys (sk', vk') of the scheme S ', sets vk = (vk', pek, pek'), stores sk', td, td ', and returns vk to A. As one can see, the value Rt is a uniformly distributed G i element as in Game 5. Moreover, St is a correctly distributed signature since
Finally, B returns to A the signature a = (oAk, Zk, Rt , St). Proof Assume that A is a PPT adversary such that Pr[G7(A)] = e. Then we show how to build a PPT simulator B which uses A to solve the FDHI problem with advantage e. B z r receives an FDHI instance (g1, g2, gz z , gV, g\ , g [, g\ ) and works as follows.
B proceeds as the challenger in Game 6 by choosing a random $ index x ■ < - [Q] . Next, it runs the trapdoor generation algo rithm for the programmable pseudorandomness of H, (td, pek) •< -H.TrapGen(1A, bgp, g1, g1, g2, g2), and the trapdoor generation algorithm for the (poly, 0, 1)-programmability of H7, (td7, pek7) -H7.T rap G en (1 \ bgp, g1, g1, g2, g2). Finally, it generates the keys (sk7, vk7) of the scheme £ 7, sets vk = (vk7, pek, pek7), stores sk7, td, td7, and returns vk to A. Note that the signature is correctly distributed as in Game 7, since R t is a uniformly distributed G i element, and
and cj H'.
and computes and returns a = (Z x , aA^, R T, ST) to A. As one can check, such signature is distributed as a signature in Game 7: Rt = g-Cr'0 as in the definition of Game 7 (for the fx-th dataset) while for ST we have
ZCt,1 -CT,0 ET=f i j z)mi 
Note that the simulation of Game 7 provided by B to A is statistically close (by a factor y + y ' due to the use of TrapGen in H and HO to the real execution of Game 7. Then, it is easy to see that if Game 7 outputs 1, B is able to compute the solution of the FDHI problem, as described above. In conclusion, if Pr[G7(A)] > e then B has advantage at least (S'e) -y -y ' in solving FDHI. □ Finally, we note that when instantiated with our APHF Hsqrt from Sect. 3.3, the programma bility properties stated in the theorem hold with probability S' = 1 while the property of statistically-close trapdoor keys holds in a perfect sense, i.e., y = 0 and y ' = 0.
C ontext-hiding security
In this section, we prove the context-hiding security of our linearly homomorphic signature scheme.
Proof (Theorem 9) First notice that since in our case there is no hiding procedure (i.e., one can see Hide as the identity function and HVerify as Ver), correctness and unforgeability follow trivially. In order to prove context-hiding security, we construct below a simulator and then show that its signatures are perfectly indistinguishable from the ones obtained through a run of the Eval algorithm. 
The simulator finally outputs a signature a 1 = (aa , Z , R, S). Indistinguishability o f signatures Here we show that our simulator allows for context hid ing security. Fix any choice of (sk, vk) e K eyG en(lA, L), P a = ((f t , ft) , t i ,...,T £ ,A ) , and mt,mt e M T . For all i = t to t , we have ai = Sign(sk, A , t , m i) with ai = (aA,i, Z i, R i, Si), and notice that since the scheme E ' is deterministic fixing sk', A , Tt, m t , . . . , T t , m t fixes also all the signatures a t , . . . , a t . Let a 0 -E v a l( v k ,a t,..., at) and recall that by construction the signature a 0 = (a'A , Z R ' , S') consists of:
-Z ' = Zt = g2, where z -PRF.K G^(A ).
-a A = a a ,t -Sign'(sk', A |Z).
-R' = n t=t Rf , where R = g^ and ri -PRF.KG^^ (A | Ti).
-S' = n t= t S f .
Let us now assume that we have a distinguisher D which is given I = (sk, vk, P a , m t, a t , . . . , m t, at) and either one of a 0 -Eval(vk, f , {ai }t=t) or a 1 -Sim(s£, P a , m).
In what follows we show that a 0 and a 1 are distributed identically, that is any D has advantage 0 in distinguishing the two cases. To prove this, we are going to compare the two signatures a 0, a 1 element by element. R' = n t=t Ri fi r = n t=t Rfi By the construction of the simulator the elements {Ri }t_ t are the same on both sides since in both cases are generated deterministically using the PRF F with seed K . This implies R = R'.
We claim that S' = S. To see this, let us recall how each Si is defined: by the signing algorithm m t / z we have Si = yU Ti ■ Ri ■ f[^= t f j S' = n t= t S f . Therefore
where the last equality follows from the fact that m =: ^"^ fi m i.
i =0
Short signatures with shorter public keys from bilinear maps
In this section we describe how to use APHFs to construct in a generic fashion standard-model signature schemes over bilinear groups. We propose two constructions that are provablysecure under the q -Strong Diffie-Hellman [10] and the q -Diffie-Hellman [9] assumptions. These constructions are the analogues of the schemes in [30, 32] respectively. The basic idea behind the constructions is to replace a standard (m, 1)-PHF with an (m, 1, d )-APHF. In fact, in this context, having a secretly-computable H does not raise any issue when using H in the signing procedure as the signer already uses a secret key. At the same time, for verification purposes, computing the (public) isomorphic copy of H in the target group is also sufficient. Our proof confirms that the (m, 1, d )-programmability can still be used to control the size of the randomness in the same way as in [30, 32] . One difference in the security proof is that the schemes in [30, 32] are based on the q-(S)DH assumption, where q is the number of signing queries made by the adversary, whereas ours have to rely on the (q + d -1)-(S)DH problem. Since our instantiations use d = 2, the difference (when considering concrete security) is very minor. When plugging into these generic constructions our new APHF, Hacfs, described in Sect. 3.2, which is (m, 1, 2)-programmable, we obtain schemes that, for signing -Obits mes sages, allow for public keys of length O (m \[t) as in [39] .
We describe the scheme based on q-SDH in Sect. 5.1, and the one based on q -DH in Sect. 5.2. As discussed in [32] , the advantage of the scheme from q-DH compared to the one from q -SDH is to be based on a weaker assumption.
A q -strong D iffie-H ellm an based solution
In this section we revisit the q -SDH based solution of [30] . The signature £qSDH = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) is as follows:
KeyGen(1X). Let X be the security parameter, and let -= -(X) and p = p(X) be arbitrary polynomials. Our scheme can sign messages in {0, 1}-using randomness in {0, 1}p. The key generation algorithm works as follows:
-Run bgp --G(1X) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp = (p, Gx, G2, G t , g1 , g2, e) where G1, G2 and G t are asymmetric groups of prime order p ~ 2X, g1 e G1, g2 e G2 are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^ G t is an efficiently computable, non degenerate bilinear map.
-Run (sek, pek) --H.Gen(1X, bgp) to generate the keys of the asymmetric hash func tion. -Choose a random x -Z p and set X -g^. Return vk = (bgp, pek, X ) and sk = (sek, x ).
Sign (sk, M ). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, and a message M e {0, 1}-. It starts by generating a random r --{0, 1}p. Next, it computes a = H.PriEval(sek, M )~ and outputs (a, r ). Ver (vk, M , (a, r) ). To check that (a, r) is a valid signature, check that r is of length p and that
We state the security of the scheme in the following theorem (whose proof appears in the full version). We note that for simplicity our proof assumes an We prove the lemma via a sequence of games. We denote with Gi the event that Game i outputs 1, i.e., that B (successfully) forges in Game i .
Game 0 This game is the standard existential unforgeability experiment ExpUF-CMA. Clearly,
Game 1 This is the same as the previous game but the parameter of the APHF are generated using H.TrapGen (rather than H.Gen). More precisely, A runs H.TrapGen(1A, g1, h 1 , g2, hfi), where g1, g2 are, randomly chosen, generators and h1 = g f, h2 = g% $ for a randomly chosen a -Z p .B y the y -closeness of the trapdoor keys, we have:
Game 2 In this game we do the following changes. First, we choose the r i's used to answer signing queries all in advance (rather than one by one when needed). Since the ri 's are chosen at random and independently anyway this change cannot affect B's advantage at all. Second, we modify the way g1, h\, g2, h2 are chosen when executing H.TrapGen. Specifically, let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. We choose i* gr { 1 ,...,q } and we set r* = ri*, R = uq=1ri , R* = R \{r*} and R *'' = R \ {r*, r,}. Next, we define the polynomials p*(z) = ]"[reR* (z + r) mod p and p(z) = p*(z)(z + r *) mod p. Notice that both polynomials are of degree < q . Thus, from g i , g i , g ? £ q it is possible to compute g 1 = g p (x) and h 1 = g p x ). Next we set g2 = g2, X = g% and h2 = g2 +r ). The distribution of g i, g2 is identical to the one in Game 1. The only difference might occur in the case p ( x ) = 0, as in this case gi, hi would not be generators. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [37, 40] , however, this happens only with probability at most q / p. Thus Moreover, for all the signing queries that do not cause Bads, notice that CMt,0 = 0 and thus such signing queries can be answered without any explicit knowledge of x .A s a consequence,
Pr[G6] = Pr[G5]
Notice also that in Game 6, we are assuming that neither Bad5 nor Bad4 occur. This means that, for the the forged signature (M *,a*, r *) one has that H.PriEval(sek, M *) = gc iM*(x+r ^ and cM*,0 = 0. Using the same notation as above, using the q-SDH instance we can compute cm i (x+r*) y = 81 x+r* as cm i (x + r *) isa polynomial of degree < 2 without the constant term, i.e, Cm i (x + r *) is divisible by (x + r *). We set a / {a* • y -1 ) 1/cm*,°1 p*(x) 1 Using standard techniques [10, 30] , a ' can be used to extract the required < g1 x+r . This means that Pr[G6] < e. Finally, putting together the bounds from the games above yields the lemma. Game 0 This game is the standard existential unforgeability experiment ExpUF-CMA.
Clearly,
P r[G 0] = e_2
Game 1 This is the same as Game 1 above, (i.e. the parameter of the programmable hash function are generated using H.TrapGen (rather than H.Gen). Thus,
Game 2 In this game we do the following changes. First, we choose the ri 's used to answer signing queries all in advance (rather than one by one when needed). Second, we modify the way g1, h \, g2, h2 are chosen when executing H.TrapGen. Specifically, let g1 be a generator of G1 and g2 be a generator of G2. We we set R = uq= j r ; . Next we define the (degree-q) polynomial p(z) = n=R(z + r) mod p . From g1 , < g1, . . . , it is possible to compute g1 = 8 \ (X ) and h1 = g1 = 8 \ (X ). Next we set g2 = g2, X = 8x , andh2 = (for random a •< -Z p). Note that the distribution of g1, g2 is identical with respect to Game 1. Again, the only difference might occur in the case when p (x ) = 0, as in this case g1 would not be a generator. Notice also that since we are assuming that Bad3 does not occur we have that, from the produced forgery on M * we can extract 1 p(x) a ' = {a *) 1/Cm* (a) = g 1 x+ * = g 1 x+ * Again, by using standard techniques [10, 30] , a ' can be used to extract the required 1 gx+r . Hence, Pr[G4] < e. Finally, putting together the bounds from the games above yields the lemma.
A q -D iffie-H ellm an based solution
In this section we show how to revisit the q -DH based scheme of [32] in order to work with APHFs. Our construction uses a standard PHF as an additional building block. We construct a signature £qDH = (KeyGen, Sign, Ver) as follows:
KeyGen(1A). Let k be the security parameter, and let £ = £(k) and p = p(k) be arbitrary polynomials. The scheme can sign messages in {0, 1}£ using randomness in {0, 1}p. The key generation algorithm works as follows:
-Run bgp -G(1k) to generate the bilinear groups parameters bgp = (p, G1, G2, G t , g1 , g2, e) where G1, G2 and G t are groups of prime order p ~ 2k, g1 e G1, g2 e G2 are generators and e : G1 x G2 ^ G t is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate bilinear map.
-Run (sek, pek) -H.Gen(1k, bgp) to generate the keys of the asymmetric hash func tion. -Let D = (PHF.Gen, PHF.Eval) be a group hash function [30] over G 2 with input length p such that D is programmable using the algorithms (PHF.TrapGen, PHF.TrapEval).
Run (k, t ) -PHF.TrapGen(1k, gi, g1), for a random y --Z p .
-Return vk = (bgp, pek, k) and sk = (sek, t , y ). In what follows, we use the same notation of [32] , and use d (r) as a shorthand for (a, b) -PHF.TrapEval(T, r), d (r) = a + yb.
Sign(sk, M ). The signing algorithm takes as input the secret key sk, and a message M e {0, 1}^. It starts by generating a random r e {0, 1}p. Next, it 1 computes a = H.PriEval(sek, M ) a n d outputs (a, r). Ver (vk, M , (a, r) ). To verify that (a, r) is a valid signature, check that r is of length p , that d (r) = 0 and that e(a, PH F.Eval(r)) = H.PubEval(pek, M)
We prove the security of the scheme in the following theorem. We note that for simplicity our proof assumes an Notice that these two cases are mutually exclusive and completely cover the set of possible forgeries. Now we show that both types of forgeries can be used to violate the (q + 1)-DH assumption. Again we prove the lemma via a sequence of games, and use Gi to denote the event that B (successfully) forges in Game i .
